This paper examines the extent to which permanent terms-of-trade shocks have an asymmetric effect on private savings. The first part uses a simple three-period model to show that, if households expect to face binding borrowing constraints in bad states of nature, savings rates will respond asymmetrically to favorable movements in the permanent component of the terms of trade-in contrast to what conventional consumption-smoothing models would predict. The second part tests for the existence of asymmetric effects of terms-of-trade disturbances while controlling for various standard determinants of private savings. The results, based on panel data for non-oil commodity exporters of sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1980-96, indicate that periods of increases in the permanent component of the terms of trade tend indeed be associated with higher rates of private savings.
Introduction
It is well recognized that the macroeconomic effects of terms-of-trade shocks can be very significant in developing countries. As documented, for instance, by Agénor, McDermott and Prasad (2000) , terms-of-trade disturbances are highly correlated with output fluctuations and can be a major source of aggregate economic volatility. Such disturbances tend also to have a large impact on savings (both private and public), in part because of their large income effects. Moreover, there is some informal evidence suggesting that terms-of-trade shocks can entail an asymmetric response in savings, as a result, for instance, of the existence of borrowing constraints on world financial markets. Specifically, the experience of the past few years suggests that households (and governments) from poor countries may be able to deposit their windfall savings on the international capital market in good times, but that they may be unable to borrow as much as they would like in bad times because of collateral problems or a (perceived) high risk of default (see World Bank (1999, Chapter 2)). As emphasized by Deaton (1992) , among others, this asymmetry can create an incentive for precautionary saving, because in the case of a negative shock consumption can be smoothed only by running down previously accumulated assets.
There is relatively scant empirical evidence on whether terms-of-trade shocks can generate an asymmetric response in private savings. This paper attempts to fill this void by using cross-section econometric regressions for a group of countries for which movements in the terms of trade have traditionally represented a key source of macroeconomic shocks, non-oil exporters of sub-Saharan Africa. It is organized as follows. Section II discusses analytical issues. It reviews briefly the conventional, consumption-smoothing approach to assessing the effects of terms-of-trade shocks on savings, and considers the role of borrowing constraints in explaining an asymmetric consumption and savings response by private agents to this type of shocks. It elaborates, in particular, on the role of expected borrowing constraints in bad states of 2 nature. Section III provides some informal evidence on the asymmetric response of private savings during recent episodes of upswings and downswings in prices of commodities exported by non-oil sub-Saharan African countries.
Section IV specifies a regression model in order to assess the existence of an asymmetric effect of terms-of-trade movements on private savings and describes the estimation technique. Section V presents the empirical results, based on panel data covering the period 1980-96 for non-oil exporters of subSaharan Africa. The last section summarizes the results and provides some directions for further research.
Analytical Issues
Early contributions to the analysis of the effect of terms-of-trade shocks on saving include those of Harberger (1950) and Laursen and Meltzer (1950) .
The Harberger-Laursen-Meltzer (HLM) effect predicts a positive relationship between (transitory) changes in the terms of trade and saving, as a result of consumption smoothing.
1 An adverse transitory movement in the terms of trade, for instance, leads to a decrease in a country's current level of income that is larger than the decrease in its permanent income. Consumption smoothing behavior leads therefore to a fall in domestic saving. On the contrary, a permanent deterioration in the terms of trade, to the extent that it leads to a concomitant reduction in both current and permanent income, will have no effect on saving. Evidence supporting this view has been provided in a variety of studies. Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1993) , for instance, analyzed the impact of the 1976-77 coffee boom (caused by a frost in Brazil) on 1 The initial formulation by Harberger (1950) and Laursen and Meltzer (1950) relied on a Keynesian-type open economy framework. It was later extended to an intertemporal setting, notably by Obstfeld (1982) , and Svensson and Razin (1983) , and subsequently Edwards (1989) and Gavin (1990) ; see also Obstfeld and Rogoff (1997) . These contributions also highlighted the distinction between permanent and transitory shocks, and the importance of an endogenous rate of time preference for movements in the terms of trade to generate transitory movements in savings.
rural saving in Kenya. They found that proceeds from this boom were fully passed on to farmers, and that about 60 percent of the income windfall was saved.
2
In this paper we focus on a different issue, which is the possibility that permanent terms-of-trade shocks may have an asymmetric effect on savings, depending on whether they are favorable or unfavorable. To explore this idea analytically, we consider a model in which consumers (or households) are identical and live for three periods. They may also be subject to borrowing constraints during some periods of their life when faced with bad shocks.
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Suppose that the representative consumer has a quadratic utility function, and that both the rate of time preference and the real interest rate are set to zero. Specifically, assume that total utility over the lifespan of the typical household, V , is given by
where
where c h is consumption in period h and φ, τ ≥ 0. We assume that φ is small enough to ensure that in the relevant region, the marginal utility of consumption is positive. Equation (2) allows for the presence of habit 2 As discussed for instance by Ostry and Reinhart (1992) and McDermott and Cashin (1998) , if households consume both tradables and nontradables, there will be both intratemporal and intertemporal substitution effects associated with a terms-of-trade shock; these effects may be large enough to offset the conventional effect associated with consumption smoothing considerations. However, Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart (1996) found that in low-income countries (where levels of income are near the subsistence level) both intratemporal and intertemporal substitution effects have a relatively limited impact on savings; overall, their empirical results supported the view that transitory adverse movements in the terms of trade in these countries tend to lead to a reduction in private saving-as predicted by the Harberger-Laursen-Metlzer effect.
3 Life-cycle models with borrowing constraints include Hubbard and Judd (1986) and Zeldes (1989) . In both of these models, liquidity constraints are imposed exogenously in the form of simple non-negative wealth constraints. 4 formation-changes in the current level of consumption relative to the previous level entails disutility, proportional to τ . We assume that prior to period 1, both income and consumption are stable, and were expected to remain such. Hence, the initial level of assets at period 1 is zero, and consumption is equal to income, y:
Suppose now that, at the beginning of period 1, there is a change in the underlying stochastic process of income. First, a permanent shock increases income by ε. Second, an adverse transitory shock (induced, for instance, by an adverse movement in the terms of trade) may occur in the second period with probability q, reducing second-period income by δ. Hence, the revised income path is anticipated to be
A convenient feature of the model described by equations (1) and (2) is that, in the absence of habit formation (τ = 0), and with a well-functioning capital market, the consumer would behave according to the permanent income hypothesis. That is, if indeed consumers face an adverse transitory shock in period 2, they will borrow in that period in order to smooth their consumption path. A key issue, however, is whether borrowing is at all fea-
sible. In what follows we evaluate the impact of credit constraints on savings by contrasting two scenarios: the first assumes that consumers have full access to the international capital market, whereas the second considers the case where consumers are unable to borrow, due for instance to perceptions of country sovereign risk.
With full access to the capital market, consumers borrow in period 2 in bad states of nature and repay fully in period 3. The representative con-sumer's problem is thus, with x = 1 + ε:
. (4) where s L 2 (respectively s H 2 ) denotes second-period savings if the adverse income shock is indeed positive (zero).
The first-order conditions of the above problem provide three linear equa-
, from which we can infer that
where θ = τ /φ measures the relative importance of habit formation versus the diminishing marginal utility of consumption. Note that
Equation (6) corresponds to the case where habit formation is absent (θ = τ = 0). In these circumstances, saving in period 1 is determined simply by the difference between endowment, given by x = 1 + ε, and permanent income, given by
3 in line with the prediction of the permanent income hypothesis. Consumption in the first period will increase by the permanent increase in income, minus the expected value of the transitory shock, smoothed over the 3 periods of life. Equation (7) corresponds to the other extreme, where adjustment of consumption is extremely costly (or the marginal utility is constant). Note that habit formation implies that a fraction of the permanent shock is saved in the first period, in order to smooth the cost of adjustment across time.
Applying the first-order conditions we indeed infer that, in the absence of 6 habit formation, and if the adverse shock does hit consumers in the second period, the revised permanent income would be
so that savings would be
Equation (8) indicates that if an adverse transitory shock does indeed reduce second-period income, households will borrow to smooth their con-
sumption.
In what follows, we assume that the habit formation parameter φ and the permanent shock are not large enough relative to the transitory shock so that s L 2 < 0. Suppose, however, that borrowing is not feasible, due (as argued earlier) to country risk considerations. In these circumstances, the maximization problem of the representative household becomes
Solving this problem, we can infer that the presence of borrowing constraints modifies first-period savings tõ
Hence, in the absence of habit formation,
Comparing (6) and (11), we find that first-period saving are higher under borrowing constraints, as the consumer is accumulating assets to reduce the expected hardship in the second period. It follows from these equations that
Hence, the higher the probability of an adverse shock to second-period income, and the larger the magnitude of the shock, the greater will be the gap between the saving rates with and without borrowing constraints. In addition, greater habit formation (as measured by a higher θ) reduces the gap between the two saving rates.
For the issue at hand, and as noted earlier, the transitory shock to second-period income can be interpreted as a temporary terms-of-trade shock, whereas the shock ε can be viewed as a change in the permanent component. What the model predicts, therefore, is that in line with the "symmetric" Harberger-Laursen-Meltzer effect, positive (negative) transitory income shocks are entirely saved (dissaved). In addition, however, a fraction of permanent income should also be set aside during "good" times (that is, in period 1), if there is habit formation. Indeed, as can be inferred from (10), as long as θ > 0, the permanent shock ε has a positive effect on first-period savings. Thus, the possibility of binding borrowing constraints in "bad" states of nature, which can be viewed in the present context as corresponding to periods of adverse terms-of-trade shocks, implies (under habit formation) an asymmetric response of savings to permanent income shocks.
It is worth noting that, in the foregoing discussion, we focused only on the case of an adverse transitory shock in the second period to simplify the analysis. If the transitory second-period shock is positive, the borrowing constraint will not bind. Hence, even if the transitory shock follows a symmetric distribution, the qualitative features of our analysis will continue to hold. We can illustrate this point with a simple example. Suppose that the second-period transitory shock is δ with a probability equal to one-half, and −δ with a probability one-half; suppose also that there is no habit formation (τ = 0). All the other assumptions continue to hold. It is easy to verify that in these conditions
Hence, first-period saving is zero in the absence of borrowing constraints, 8 whereas it is positive in the presence of these constraints (in fact, proportional to the standard deviation of the transitory shock).
Finally, we show in Appendix A that loss aversion magnifies the increase in saving induced by the anticipation of future binding borrowing constraints induced by terms-of-trade shocks. The intuition underlying this result is that under loss aversion (a particular form of asymmetric utility preferences), individuals exhibit a larger degree of risk aversion to adverse shocks to income.
As a result, they tend to save more in good times, increasing their consumption by less than the increase in income. Specifically, we follow the specification of the type of preferences explored by Aizenman (1998) . In this setting, loss-averse agents tend to treat the future asymmetrically, assigning a greater probability weight to bad states of nature (compared to the probability weights that they would assign in the conventional case) in measuring expected utility. As a result, saving responds asymmetrically under loss aversion, in contrast to the conventional expected utility framework.
Some Informal Evidence
Before testing some of the key predictions of our model using regression (comparing 1980 and 1981-86) . However, there are also several cases for which the "average" pattern does not hold. In Madagascar (comparing 1994-96 and 1986-93) , Mali, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (comparing 1983 -85 and 1980 -82), and Zambia (comparing 1987 -89 an 1990 . All in all, therefore, the informal evidence seems to support the view that there may be some asymmetric responses at play, although broad generalizations across countries are difficult to make.
The foregoing analysis, although informative, faces several limitations.
First, it does not account for country-specific changes in the terms of trade.
Second, it does not control for other possible influences on private savings, in addition to changes in the terms of trade, thereby making it difficult to isolate the specific effect of these changes. Third, it is not based on an explicitly distinction between permanent and temporary movements in the terms of trade, along the lines discussed earlier. All three issues are addressed in the next section, in the context of a fully specified regression framework.
Econometric Methodology
We now turn to time-series, cross-country regression techniques to assess more formally the extent to which terms-of-trade shocks affect asymmetrically private savings. The permanent component of the terms of trade is measured by the trend series obtained with a modified version of the ideal band pass filter of Baxter and King (1999) . The Baxter-King filter is a linear transformation of the data which leaves intact the components of the data within a specified band of frequencies and eliminates all other components.
But applying this filter is often difficult in practice, because it requires in principle a very large amount of data. Christiano and Fitzgerald (1999) proposed a modified version of the Baxter-King filter, based on an optimal linear approximation. This method can be briefly explained as follows. Let y t be the data created by applying the ideal band pass filter to the raw data, x t . y t is approximated by b y t , which is a filter for x t . The filter weights are chosen to minimize the mean square error:
and e B T −t and e B t−1 are linear functions of B j 's:
and e B t−1 solves
In our case, p u = 6 and p l = 2. • The lagged dependent variable, which aims to capture habit formation effects (as suggested by Alessie and Lusardi (1997) and as implied by our analytical model), or more generally partial adjustment of the desired propensity to save to its actual value.
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• The transitory component of the log of the terms of trade, which is expected to have also a positive effect on saving.
• An index of volatility of the terms of trade (defined as the standard deviation of the log-difference of the terms of trade over the current period and three lagged periods), which may represent a proxy for income uncertainty. This can in general have either a positive or negative effect on saving.
• The log of the real gross national product (GNP) per capita, which captures the impact of the level of income (and indirectly subsistence 5 See Agénor and Montiel (1999, Chapter 3) and Agénor (2000, Chapter 1) for a detailed review of the recent evidence on the determinants of savings in developing countries. Note that, unlike others (such as Edwards (1996), Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (1999) , and Masson, Bayoumi, and Samiei (1998)), we have excluded foreign saving, as measured by the current account surplus, from the list of regressors. 6 Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (1999) also attempt to distinguish between shortand long-term determinants of saving rates-a distinction that appeared highly significant in their empirical results. 13 considerations) on consumption and saving decisions, or more generally the level of development. This is expected to have a positive effect on private saving.
• Inflation (as measured by the rate of change of the GDP deflator), which exerts a negative impact on the rate of return on saving (with sluggish nominal interest rates), It also represents a proxy for income variability and macroeconomic instability, thereby capturing a precautionary motive for saving. Through both channels, inflation is expected to reduce the propensity to save.
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• The ratio of quasi money to broad money, which is used to capture the process of financial liberalization. This variable may have either a positive or negative effect on private savings, depending on whether financial liberalization increases the rate of return on, say, bank deposits (thereby increasing financial savings), or on the contrary takes the form of a relaxation of domestic liquidity constraints (which would tend to increase consumption and thus reduce savings).
• The age dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of the population younger than 15 years and older than 64 years old to the population between 15 and 64 years old. This variable is also expected to have a negative effect on the incentives to save.
• Government saving, as given by the fiscal surplus. As predicted by the Ricardian equivalence proposition (see, for instance, Seater (1993)), if agents fully internalize the effects of current budget deficits on future tax liabilities (and thus on future consumption), government saving should have a coefficient of minus unity in a regression where the dependent variable is the private saving rate.
In addition to these variables, and to capture the existence of an asymmetric effect of the terms of trade on saving, the permanent component of the log of that variable (calculated using the modified Baxter-King filter described earlier) is entered in the following way. The sample is split between "positive" (or favorable) and "negative" (or unfavorable) values, defined in two different ways (see Appendix B for more details). First, a positive (negative) value is defined when the permanent component of the terms of trade at t is greater (lower) than its value at t − 1 as well as greater (lower) than its within-sample mean. Second, we define a positive (negative) value when the permanent component of the terms of trade at t is greater (lower) than its value at t − 1 and greater (lower) than its within-sample mean plus one standard deviation. This procedure allows us to test to some extent the sensitivity of the results to the way "positive" and "negative" values are defined.
According to our theoretical model, the estimated coefficient on the positive values the permanent component of the terms of trade should be positive and significant, whereas the estimated coefficient on the negative values should be insignificant.
The regression model that we use includes the lagged value of the dependent variable (the savings ratio) as a regressor. As is well known, in such as case the usual approach to estimating a fixed-effects model with panel data, the least squares dummy variable technique (LSDV), generates biased estimates of the coefficients; this bias can be large when the time dimension of the panel is small. Judson and Owen (1999) compared several methods for estimating this type of dynamic panel data models with fixed effects, using a Monte Carlo approach. Their results indicate for an unbalanced panel with a time dimension that is between 10 and 20-which is the case here-the "best" estimation methods are either the GMM estimation technique of Arellano and Bond (1991) , or the technique of Anderson and Hsiao (1981) . 8 In this study we use the Arellano-Bond technique, which can be briefly described as follows. Consider the following regression equation,
where s is the private saving rate, α a scalar coefficient, β a vector of parameters, Z the set of explanatory variables (other than the lagged saving rate), η an unobserved country-specific effect, ε the error term, and the subscripts i and t represent country and time period, respectively. This equation can be rewritten as
and we can take first differences to eliminate the country-specific effect:
The use of instruments is required to deal with both the endogeneity of the explanatory variables and the fact that, by construction, the new error term, ε it −ε it−1 , is correlated with the lagged dependent variable, s it−1 −s it−2 .
Under the assumptions that a) the error term is not serially correlated, and b) the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous (that is, the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term), the Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic panel estimator uses the following moment conditions:
for h ≥ 2, and t = 3, ...T.
Accordingly, we choose as instrumental variables the private saving rate at t−2 and t−3 and the current values of all the other independent variables.
Evidence for sub-Saharan Africa
The regression framework described in the previous section was used to estimate the existence of asymmetric effects of changes in the terms of trade for non-oil sub-Saharan African countries using time-series, cross-country data covering the period 1980-96. We ended up using an unbalanced panel data set, because complete data were not available for all the countries in the sample for the whole period. Table 2 summarizes our regression results. Regressions (1), (3), and (5) use our first procedure for distinguishing between positive and negative values of the permanent component of the terms of trade, whereas regressions (2), (4) and (6) use the second procedure. Two sets of specification test statistics are reported for each regression, as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) .
The first statistic is a Wald test of the joint significance of the regressors.
The second statistic tests for first-and second-order serial correlation in the residuals, and are denoted m 1 and m 2 . If the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified is to be accepted, there should be evidence of negative first-order serial correlation (so that m 1 should be significant) and no evidence of second-order serial correlation (m 2 should be insignificant).
From the above discussion, it follows that the differenced error term should be serially correlated by construction, even if the original error is not.
Consider first regression (1). Both the Wald test and the serial correlation tests indicate that the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified cannot be rejected. The lagged dependent variable is highly significant, indicating (as noted earlier) either gradual adjustment to the desired level of saving or persistence effects associated with habit formation. The index of financial development (the ratio of quasi money to the broad money stock) has a significant and positive effect on private savings; as noted earlier, this result is consistent with the view that the relaxation of domestic liquidity constraints (resulting from increased access to bank credit, for instance) that may be associated with financial deepening had no adverse effect on the propensity to save, even if it may have stimulated private consumption. The coefficient of the inflation rate is positive but not well determined; this may reflect the importance of low-inflation, CFA Franc countries in the sample.
Government savings has a highly significant negative effect on private savings, as found in many recent studies on developing countries; government dissavings and their future tax implications tend to be internalized by private agents. The short-term coefficient of that variable is around -0.45; the coefficient of the lagged variable is about 0.7, which gives a long-term coefficient of -0.65, which is significantly different from unity. This suggests that Ricardian equivalence does not appear to hold in the long run, as found in some recent studies (see, for instance, Loayza, Servén, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) , and Masson, Bayoumi, and Samiei (1998) ). The age dependency ratio has the expected positive sign and is reasonably well-determined statistically, whereas per capita income is not significant.
As predicted by the consumption-smoothing view, the transitory (cyclical) component of the terms of trade is very significant and has the right sign.
However, the short-term coefficient of that variable is around 0.09 whereas the long-term value is only around 0.13; both of these values are significantly different from unity, suggesting that the "pass-through" is less than complete-perhaps because households are unable (even in the long run) to assess fully the degree of persistence of terms-of-trade shocks. The index of terms-of-trade volatility performs poorly in the regression and is wrongly signed. 9 Our results therefore do not corroborate those of Ghosh and Ostry (1994) , according to which terms-of-trade volatility tends to have a positive effect on private savings.
The results also indicate that favorable movements in the permanent component of the terms of trade have a positive and statistically significant effect on private savings, whereas unfavorable movements in that variable have no discernible statistical effect. These results are consistent with the main prediction of our analytical framework, according to which households facing uncertain movements in their income induced by terms-of-trade shocks may save a non-zero fraction of those changes that are perceived to be permanent in good times. At the same time, it should be noted that, despite being significant, the coefficient of that variable is not very large.
Regression (2) (5) and (6) indicate that this was not the case. At the same time, all the other results discussed earlier continue to hold. In addition, the specification tests also suggest that the assumption that the model is correctly specified cannot be rejected. Overall, therefore, the regression results presented here appear to provide fairly robust evidence that movements in the permanent component of the terms of trade tend to have the asymmetric effect hypothesized earlier on private savings.
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Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to examine whether terms-of-trade shocks have an asymmetric effect on private savings. The first part used a simple three-period framework to argue that, in the presence of binding borrowing constraints in bad states of nature, saving rates can be sensitive to favorable movements in the permanent component of the terms of trade-in contrast to what the conventional consumption-smoothing framework would predict.
Households in developing countries (particularly those that have limited creditworthiness to begin with) may indeed be unable to smooth consumption when faced with adverse shocks to world commodity prices and the terms of trade, because they are subject to credit constraints that become tighter more binding in such situations. As a result, to maintain a smooth consumption path, domestic agents may be forced to dissave by a larger amount than they would otherwise. This argument also suggests that, to the extent that domestic agents internalize the possibility of facing tighter credit constraints in bad states of nature, they may also consume less of their permanent income, and instead save a fraction of it, in good times.
The second part provided some informal evidence, based on data for nonoil commodity exporters of sub-Saharan Africa, on the behavior of private savings during episodes of terms-of-trade improvements and deteriorations, as captured by movements in international commodity prices. We found indeed some support for the view that the private savings ratio may have responded asymmetrically in many cases, but that broad generalizations across countries were not warranted. We then turned to a more formal empirical test of asymmetry. The third part described the econometric methodology and the specification of the regression model, which controls for various standard determinants of private savings. The fourth part presented and discussed our empirical results, based on an unbalanced panel dataset for non-oil commodity exporters of sub-Saharan Africa covering the period 1980-96. Overall, they suggest that transitory movements in the terms of trade have a positive 20 effect (albeit less than one to one) on the propensity to save, as suggested by the Harberger-Laursen-Meltzer effect. We also found that the dependency ratio and the degree of financial development have positive effects on private savings, whereas the level of income per capita and inflation have no discernible effect. Most importantly for our purpose, we found that favorable movements in the permanent component of the terms of trade (defined in two different ways) tend indeed to lead to higher rates of private savings, as predicted by our analytical framework.
Our interpretation focused on the adjustment of saving to a permanent shock, in circumstances where borrowing constraints are anticipated to bind in the future and habit formation are present. It should be noted, however, that our empirical results could be consistent with another interpretation.
For instance, if the permanent shock is associated with an anticipated increase in future volatility, it would raise the demand for assets needed to be used as an effective buffer stock in the future, thereby increasing private savings today. Nevertheless, it can be verified that the logic of our analysis continues to apply in this case-the increase in the demand for the buffer stock is magnified by the anticipation of future borrowing credit constraints and by greater loss aversion.
The analysis developed in this paper can be extended to study the asymmetric effects of terms-of-trade shocks on savings in oil-exporting countries, both public and private. 10 This is important because of the policy concerns that the high degree of commodity price volatility has generated in recent years. The 1998 slump in commodity prices, for instance, generated large terms-of-trade effects. Although the real income effect on primary commodity exporters was moderate (of the order of -0.5 percent of GDP), and net importers of oil and primary commodities actually registered a gain overall, oil exporters registered a negative real income effect of the order of -6.3 percent of GDP (World Bank (2000, Chapter 4)). Because oil exports account for almost all of government revenues in oil-exporting countries, the public sector bore the brunt of adjustment. The ability of each country to smooth public consumption in response to the revenue shortfall was, however, limited by their ability to draw down their official reserves and to borrow, both domestically and abroad. In many cases, constraints on domestic finance and lack of access to international capital markets actually prevented governments from successfully smoothing the impact of the oil price cycle, and economic performance deteriorated. 11 The same study by the World Bank also noted that although adjustment to the oil price swings in the past few years differed significantly across oil exporters, most countries increased their aggregate saving rates during the rise in oil prices in 1996-97 (compared to 1993-95) and reduced them during the 1998 slump. This pattern is consistent with consumption smoothing behavior (possibly by both private households and the public sector) in the presence of transitory shocks that are perceived as such. In addition, the savings response was found to be asymmetric: on average, saving rates rose by less than half of the real income gain during the 1996-97 boom, but fell by the full amount of the decline in real incomes during the 1998 collapse in prices. Extending the analytical framework presented in this paper to account for an asymmetric response of public savings would provide a fruitful exercise.
Appendix A Loss Aversion, Savings, and Borrowing Constraints
The purpose of this Appendix is to show that, following Aizenman (1998) , loss aversion magnifies the increase in saving induced by the anticipation of future binding borrowing constraints induced by adverse shocks to income.
For expositional simplicity, we will assume the absence of habit formation, that is, the case in which τ = θ = 0 in equation (2). Loss aversion modifies the maximization problem with full access to the capital market given in (4) as follows:
where to simplify notations, u(c t−1 ; c t ) is written as u(c t ) and 1 − q ≥ ω ≥ 0.
The term ω is the extra utility weight attached to the bad state of nature due to loss aversion (see Aizenman (1998) for further details). The expected utility case corresponds to ω = 0. With no access to the capital market, the maximization problem (9) becomes
Applying (A1) if follows that with access to the world capital market, first-period saving is
whereas without access to borrowing and with no habit formation, saving is
From (A3) and (A4), we havẽ
Consequently, loss aversion magnifies the increase in saving associated with future borrowing constraints. (2000), we measure the degree of comovement of private savings and the terms of trade by the magnitude of the correlation coefficient between the stationary components of these variables (with both components derived using the same filter), ρ(j), j ∈ {0, ±1, ±2}.
We define the relation to be procyclical, acyclical, or countercyclical, depending on whether the contemporaneous correlation coefficient ρ(0) is positive, zero, or negative. In addition, we deem private savings and the terms of trade to be strongly contemporaneously correlated if 0.26 ≤ |ρ(0)| < 1, weakly contemporaneous correlated if 0.15 ≤ |ρ(0)| < 0.26, and contemporaneously uncorrelated with the cycle if 0 ≤ |ρ(0)| < 0.15. 12 In addition, the cross-correlation coefficients ρ(j), j ∈ {±1, ±2} indicate the phase-shift of the terms of trade relative to private savings the cycle in industrial output. Again, in line with the existing literature, we say that the terms of trade "lead" private savings by j period(s) if |ρ(j)| is maximum for a negative j, is synchronous if |ρ(j)| is maximum for j = 0, and lags private savings if |ρ(j)| is maximum for a positive j. These correlations coefficients are reported in Table 1 . Private savings and the terms of trade are strongly contemporaneously correlated in 18 out of 29 countries. In addition, this relation is procyclical in 16 countries, acyclical in one (Mauritania), and countercyclical in 12 countries. Finally, movements in the terms of trade lead fluctuations in private savings by one or two years in 12 countries (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Rwanda, Swaziland, Togo, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe), is synchronous in 9 countries (Botswana, Chad, Congo, Guinea, Madagascar, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa, and Zambia), and lags private savings in 8 countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Senegal, and Uganda). Second, in order to determine the relative importance of cyclical fluctuations and changes in the trend components of private savings and the terms of trade, we calculated the ratio of of the standard deviation of the transitory component of each series and divided it by the standard deviation of the raw series. The results are reported in Table 2 . They indicate indeed that in almost all of the countries of the sample, a large fraction of actual changes in private savings or the terms of trade are due to fluctuations in the cyclical component of these variables. All in all, the preliminary evidence suggests indeed a close correlation between movements in the terms of trade and private savings, whether one looks at levels or the volatility of these variables. Terms-of-trade shocks are often induced by sharp changes in world commodity prices. It is well recognized that such changes tend to be asymmetric: the typical pattern is often one of long troughs and sharp peaks. As recently estimated by Cashin, McDermott, and Scott (1999) , the average duration of slumps in non-oil commodity price cycles is 63 months, whereas the average duration of booms is 37 months; large positive shocks also tend to occur frequently. One reason for this pattern of price movements, as formally analyzed in a stock-holding model with intertemporal arbitrage by Deaton and Laroque (1992) , is the asymmetry involved in storage: stocks cannot be negative and a stock-out will give rise to sharp movements in prices. As a result, movements in the terms of trade of individual countries have also tended to be asymmetric. The macroeconomic implications of chave received limited attention in openeconomy macroeconomics, despite the fact that many economists would agree with the view that the welfare loss from a slump may be different (possibly larger) than the gain from a boom. Cashin, Paul, C. John McDermott, and Alasdair Scott, "Booms and Slumps in World Commodity Prices," Working Paper No. 99/155, International Monetary Fund (December 1999). The estimation method used is instrumental variables with fixed effects to correct for possible endogeneity of some of the regressors with respect to movements in the terms of trade-namely, foreign saving, government saving, real GNP per capita, the growth rate of real GDP per capita, inflation, and the ratio of broad money to GDP. For instance, movements in the terms of trade may have a substantial indirect impact on the rate of economic growth, as a result of their impact on the relative price of nontraded goods, the relative price of capital goods, and thus investment. In the first stage of the estimation procedure, all the above variables were regressed on the log of the terms of trade; the index of terms-of-trade volatility; and the lagged values of the private domestic savings rate, real GNP per capita, the growth rate of real GDP per capita, inflation, and the ratio of broad money to GDP. 13 In the second stage, the fitted values from the first-stage regressions were used as instruments, rather than the actual series themselves. Finally, fixed effects are aimed at capturing differences across countries by introducing differences in the constant terms of the regressions. In standard fashion (see, for instance, Greene (1997)) they are computed by subtracting the within-sample mean from each variable and performing the estimation using the transformed data. Volatility of the terms of trade Figure 2 Agricultural, Metals and Minerals Prices, 1980 -98 (1990=100) 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. Private savings rate (SP%GDP) is the ratio of private savings to GDP. SP%GDP(-1) is the lagged value of SP%GDP. QM%M2 is the ratio of quasi money to broad money. INFL is the inflation rate in terms of the GDP deflator. SG%GDP is the ratio of general government saving to GDP. DEPRATIO is the dependency ratio.
LGNPPC is the log of per capita real GNP. TLGNPPC is the trend component of LGNPPC, obtained by using the modified Baxter-King filter as explained in the text. RLGNPPC is the residual component of LGNPPC. TLTOT is the trend component of the terms of trade. RLTOT is the residual component of the terms of trade. VLTOT4 is the volatility measure as the standard deviation of the terms of trade for periods t-3, t-2, t-1 and t. DPOS_TOTST0 is the dummy variable equal to 1 times TLTOT whenever TLTOTt is greater than both TLTOTt-1 and the mean of TLTOT. DNEG_TOTST0 is the dummy variable equal to 1 times TLTOT whenever TLTOTt is less than both TLTOTt-1 and the mean of TLTOT. DPOS_TOTST1 is the dummy variable equal to 1 times TLTOT whenever TLTOTt is greater than both TLTOTt-
